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zens in Ferguson, Missouri, and elsewhere, many commentators have
criticized the excessive militarization of law enforcement. We inves-
tigate whether surplus military-grade equipment acquired by local
police departments from the Pentagon has an effect on crime rates.
We use temporal variations in US military expenditure and between-
counties variations in the odds of receiving a positive amount of
military aid to identify the causal effect of militarized policing on
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I Introduction
In recent years, the Law Enforcement Support Program (LESO) in the US
has been the subject of considerable political controversy. This program,
known as the “1033 Program”, is a federal initiative that, since 1997, has
transferred more than $4.3 billion worth of surplus military equipment from
the Department of Defense to domestic police agencies across the US. The
program came under scrutiny in the summer of 2014, following the fatal
shooting of an unarmed 18-year-old African-American by a police officer;
and an ensuing series of protests in the city of Ferguson, Missouri. In
the aftermath of the protests, Ferguson’s police force used military-grade
weapons and armored tactical vehicles - believed to be acquired through
the “1033 Program” - to quell the riots. The perceived disproportionality
of the reaction of law enforcement has sparked a contentious debate about
the consequences of giving military capabilities to local police forces.
We investigate the causal effect of an increase in the militarization of
US local police forces on their effectiveness in preventing and solving crime
and, with Harris et al. (2016), we provide the first empirical analysis of the
consequences of the 1033 Program. To what extent has the proliferation
of military weapons within US local police forces affected their effective-
ness in countering crime? Has the acquisition of military-style equipment
contributed “to the protection of the public” and provided “effective and ef-
ficient contributions to public safety” (White House, 2014, p.6)? Although
these questions have crucial policy implications for security policies, they
have so far remained unanswered.
We use newly released data by the US Department of Defence on more
than 176,000 transfers of equipment held by 8,000 local police agencies over
the period 2006-2012. We explore whether this military grade equipment
has a tangible effect on the production function for law enforcement, mea-
sured by crime and arrest rates. These two variables allow us to disentangle
the deterrence effect produced by the display of military equipment from
the efficiency effect when the police use military equipment to solve more
crime and arrest perpetrators. Our data allow us to explore the black box
of policing by observing whether inputs to the physical stock of capital have
an effect on the quantity and efficiency of police personnel. Additionally,
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we investigate whether there is a discernibly different effect between lethal
vs. non-lethal equipment transfers by exploring variation in the type of
military hardware redistributed.
To identify the causal effect of militarized policing on crime, we interact
exogenous time variation induced by military spending and local variation
between counties in the likelihood of being an aid recipient. High military
spending, driven by international factors such as the war in Afghanistan,
caused the Department of Defence to accumulate excess reserves during
high spending years. The “1033 Program” allows the reallocation of this
excess property to law enforcement agencies across the country. We in-
teract this variable, which varies over time, with a county’s time-invariant
propensity to acquire military aid, measured as the fraction of years that a
county receives a positive quantity of equipment. Our identification rests
on a comparison between frequent and infrequent recipients, in years fol-
lowing high military spending to years following low spending, similar to a
difference-in-difference approach.
We find that military aid reduces crime rates. In particular, more mil-
itary aid leads to a decline in robberies, assaults, larcenies and motor ve-
hicles thefts, which are all part of the so-called “susceptible crimes” (a
la Draca et al. , 2011), i.e., crimes that are more likely to be prevented
by police visibility. By the most conservative estimate, a ten percent in-
crease in aid reduces total crime by 5.9 crimes per 100,000 population.1
Although the magnitude of this effect is relatively small, 0.24% of the aver-
age crime rates in treated areas (2470 crimes), the annual average value of
aid acquired by a county is around $58,000, suggesting that this is a very
inexpensive crime-reducing tool. Our results survive a variety of robustness
checks such as population weighting, differential county crime trends, and
alternative instruments such as US military fatalities.
When we focus on police activities, we find essentially no effect of aid
on arrest rates. We further find that the observed effects on crime are
not explained by an observable increase in police manpower. Yet, we do
find that an increase in the military aid might lead to release of employees
of law-enforcement agencies, suggesting that labor and capital could be
1Note that throughout the article we always refer to units of crime per 100,000
population, even when this is not explicitly stated.
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considered substitutes for some of the activities of the police. Furthermore,
we do not find evidence of an effect of military aid on injuries and assaults
on police officers. Crucially for the causa of recent public debate, we find
no effect on the number of offenders killed.
Taken together, our results suggest that employing military equipment
improves the capabilities of law enforcement to deter crime, potentially
through an unobservable police effort channel. Our cost-benefit analysis
shows that, for a ten percent spending increase, around $5,800 per county
per year, the crimes deterred amount to a social benefit of roughly $112,000.
Our results partially mirror those of Harris et al. (2016), who similarly find
that receiving tactical items leads to a reduction in property crime rates.
Interestingly, this study also finds that military aid brings a reduction of
the assaults on police officers, the number of complaints against them, and
an increase of arrest rates for drug and weapons charges.
Our study is closely related to the empirical literature on the causal
effect on crime of an increase in the funds provided to the police force (see
Chalfin & McCrary, 2014, for a recent review). Machin & Marie (2011)
find a decrease in robbery rates following the increase in targeted funds
to police forces in England and Wales. Evans & Owens (2007) find a
decline in auto theft, burglary, robbery, and aggravated assault following
receipt of grants to hire police officers. Similarly, in order to identify the
effect of an increase in the labor component of the production function of
the police, several studies have exploited temporary redeployment policies
arising from terror-related events (Di Tella & Schargrodsky, 2004; Klick &
Tabarrok, 2005; Draca et al. , 2011). Yet, none of these studies tackles the
effect of an increase in police equipment on crime.2 Our study therefore
contributes to the literature more broadly by specifically focusing on the
effect on crime rates of more “capital”, rather than more “labor”.
This paper is structured as follows: Section II provides some insights
into the 1033 Program; Section III presents our data and Section IV ex-
plains our identification strategy. Section V describes our results and Sec-
tion VI offers concluding remarks.
2The only exception is Mastrobuoni (2014), who investigates whether differences in
clearance rates across two police forces in Milan can be attributed to the availability of
advanced Information Technology strategies. He finds that this is indeed the case, and
that adopting IT innovation doubles the productivity of policing.
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II The “1033 Program”
In 1990, following several years of increasing crime levels, the US Congress,
through the National Defense Authorization Act, authorized the transfer of
excess property from the Department of Defense to federal and state agen-
cies, mainly for counter-drug related activities. The Congress made the
program permanent in 1997, expanding its scope by allowing law enforce-
ment agencies to acquire military property to assist in arrest and apprehen-
sion tasks, whilst retaining a focus on counter-drug and counter-terrorism
requests. The program was renamed the “1033 Program” in 1996, following
the replacement of Section 1208 with Section 1033. The program is under
the jurisdiction of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and is overseen by
the Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO), located at DLA Disposition
Services Headquarter.
Law enforcement agencies follow a three-step procedure to acquire mil-
itary hardware: (1) they obtain the approval of the State Coordinator and
LESO to participate in the program; (2) they place requests and provide
justification for specific items. Requests are screened by the State Coor-
dinator and the LESO Staff; (3), law enforcement agencies then receive a
decision and if their request is approved, they must cover all transporta-
tion and/or shipping costs in connection with the receipt of the equipment.3
Since the inception of the “1033 Program”, over 8,000 federal and state law
enforcement agencies have requested a variety of equipment, from assault
rifles and grenades to Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles,
helicopters and drones, to non-lethal equipment, such as high-tech cameras,
camouflage/deception equipment and office supplies.
It was not until media coverage of the Ferguson unrests, however, that
the program drew media and public attention. Since the Ferguson incident,
there has been much debate on whether local authorities’ response to crime
is often disproportionate and why e.g., the police force in a city of 20,000
residents looked like an invading army engaged in urban warfare against
street protesters.4
3We refer the readers to Harris et al. (2016) for a more detailed discussion of
the allocation process. See also http://www.dla.mil/DispositionServices/Offers/
Reutilization/LawEnforcement/ProgramFAQs.aspx
4See Amanda Taub, Why America’s police forces look like invading
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In 2014 US President Barack Obama ordered a review of the distribu-
tion of military hardware to police agencies (Reuters, 23/08/14). Following
this request, the White House released a report stating that while military
equipment has “contributed to the protection of the public and to reduced
operational risk to peace officers [..] when police lack adequate training,
make poor operational choices, or improperly use equipment, these pro-
grams can facilitate excessive uses of force and serve as a highly visible
barrier between police and the communities they secure” (White House,
2014, p. 6). Consequently, by an executive order federal transfers of cer-
tain types of military-style gear to local police departments were banned
in 2015.5
III Data
To address the question of the effect of military equipment on the activity
of the police force we use Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) data at the county
level and Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) data at
the agency level. Crime in the United States is reported by law-enforcement
agencies to the FBI, which creates summaries of these reports published as
annual statistics. The Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social
Research (ICPRS) aggregates the separate agencies into counties, taking
into account issues such as agencies spanning several counties, agencies not
reporting for certain periods and agency closures and openings.
The UCR data allows us to distinguish between several major crime
categories such as homicide, assault, robbery, burglaries, larceny and motor
vehicle theft. The LEOKA data allows us to look for an impact of military
aid on law-enforcement characteristics such as the numbers of officers and
civilian employees at the agency, the ratio between them, the number of
calls received by the police, injuries, assaults suffered by the police and
the number of offenders killed. Recently, Chalfin & McCrary (2013) raised
armies, Vox, Aug. 19, 2014, http://www.vox.com/2014/8/14/6003239/
police-militarization-in-ferguson
5President Barack Obama ordered a ban on grenade launchers, tracked armored
vehicles, armed aircraft, guns and ammunition of .50 caliber or higher, and restrictions
to the transfer of wheeled armored vehicles, drones, helicopters, firearms and riot gear,
to ensure that officers are trained in their use (Washington Post, 18/05/2015).
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concerns about the measurement error in UCR police records. We have no
reason to assume that this measurement error is associated with the amount
of military aid received. In addition, note that we drop eight percent of
the crime data due to missing control variables for some counties.
Data for the amount of military aid awarded to each county have been
recently released by the US Department of Defense and are now available
in the public domain.6 We use the DLA’s federal supply category and class
name to identify the type of equipment. We then aggregate several cate-
gories into four groups: weapons (e.g., explosives, guided missiles, guns),
vehicles (e.g., aircrafts, combat, assault, and tactical vehicles, including
their components), gears (e.g., communication devices, special clothing,
night vision equipment) and a residual category (e.g., office supplies, fur-
niture, plumbing items). Table A.1 shows our classification categories, and
the relative frequency of each category as well as the average value of each
acquisition. We use information about the original acquisition value that
was paid by the military services for the equipment.7
We also use information on the poverty rate, median income, unemploy-
ment rate, the size of the population, and the shares of males, blacks, and
people between 15-19, 20-24, 25-29 and 30-34 years old. These covariates
capture both individual criminal decision-making analysis and heteroge-
neous trends across counties. The data are taken from the US Census
Bureau and the US Department of Labor. Table 1 offers summary statis-
tics for the main variables of interest as well as for the control variables.
The table shows that, although each county in our sample experiences ap-
proximately 2500 crimes per 100,000 population every year, most of these
crimes are burglaries and larcenies, whereas homicide is a much rarer event.
All military aid is recorded as quantities and acquisition value per unit; ac-
cording to our data, a county on average receives equipment worth $58,000
per year. As one would expect, the most expensive items obtained through
6In Figure A.1 we show the monetary value of the given aid for the years in the
sample period. In the period between 2006 and 2012, the value of military donations to
law enforcement agencies went from slightly less than $30 million to almost $500 million
per year, thus expanding significantly. It then reached $750 million in 2014.
7We prefer not to use quantities (e.g., 10 guns over 30 mm up to 75 mm), as in each
category, different classes of aid have very different values (e.g., helicopters vs tractors).
The same applies to the other categories, but as a robustness check, we do replace values
with quantities.
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the 1033 Program are vehicles, such as aircraft, watercraft and armored
vehicles, and the most commonly requested items are gear, for example
clothing.
—————— [Table 1 in here] ——————
Figure 1 presents the scatter plot of military aid per capita and crime
rate. Although counties with higher crime rates should be more likely to
request support by the federal government, there is almost no association
in the aggregate between the crime rate and the total value of military aid
per capita acquired by counties. We therefore now turn to the presentation
of the empirical strategy that will allow us to find the effect of equipment
on crime.
—————— [Figure 1 in here] ——————
IV Empirical strategy
We are interested in the coefficient β from the following model:
Yc,t = βEquipmentc,t−1 + γ‘Xc,t + αc + ηs,t + c,t (1)
The outcome variable Yc,t is the crime rate for county c in year t whereas
Equipmentc,t−1 is the monetary size of the military equipment that has
been acquired by the county. We use a linear-log model i.e., we take the log
values of Equipmentc,t−1 and we keep Yc,t in its original scale.
8 We lag the
values of aid by one year to allow time for the equipment to be transferred
and placed into use.9 Xc,t is a vector of control variables described in section
III. County fixed effects αc absorb county-specific constant features such as
geographical location. It is reasonable to assume that particular counties,
such as those belonging to border states, could display a positive correlation
8Note that 21 percent of the counties did not receive any aid in the period under
consideration. We therefore use the transformation log (1 + Equipment). It is easy to
check that log (1 + Equipment) ≈ log (Equipment) for numbers around the minimum
value of most equipment. This specification is useful in the presence of diminishing
marginal returns and it is easy to interpret.
9We do not use more than one lag as the federal government requires agencies that
receive 1033 equipment to use it “within one year of receipt” (White House, 2014, p.7).
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between crime rate and the amount of aid received because of state-specific
effects. For example, states at the Mexican border require more resources
to control drug-smuggling, have higher crime rates than other states, and
are therefore more likely to request aid from the DoD. This state-specific
effect would give a positive bias to β, yet changing political policies make
this effect time-variant. We thus interact state fixed effects with time fixed
effects ηs,t, which allows us to control for state-specific policies and the
common factor in aid delivered to counties within a given state at a given
point in time.
Theoretically, an effect of aid on crime could be channeled through po-
lice manpower and through responses of criminals. A significant effect of
equipment on police and crime would constitute evidence for the former.
To verify whether an effect of aid on the crime rate might be driven by
increased police efficiency, we attempt to capture clearance rates by using
arrest rates as dependent variable and comparing the resulting coefficients
with those on crime rates. We also look at additional police outcomes
through the LEOKA data.10 If there is an effect of aid on police outcomes,
note that equation 1 with crime rates as dependent variables will resemble
the reduced form in a two stage model estimating the elasticity of crime
with respect to police characteristics, which would be comparable to previ-
ous literature (see Chalfin & McCrary, 2014). If the effect of aid on crime
is driven by responses of criminals, and not by observable police responses,
we would find an effect only on crime rates.
There could be an ex-ante positive correlation between the crime rates a
county experiences and the amount of military aid it requests. To alleviate
this concern, we employ an IV estimation method by using US military
spending in the previous year. By law, the “1033 Program” allows local
police forces to acquire excess property from the Department of Defense.
When US military spending is high (e.g., due to an increase in the intensity
of the war in Afghanistan), this generates an accumulation of military
hardware. This, in turn, increases the amount of military aid that can be
delivered to local law enforcement agencies.
10Note that the dependent variable from the LEOKA data is at the level of the
reporting agency, whereas X and Equipment remain defined at the (geographically
larger) county level.
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Given that US military spending exhibits only time variation we follow
the same procedure as Nunn & Qian (2014). We create an instrument
by interacting US military spending with a county’s tendency to receive
military aid from the federal government.11
The first stage is then:
Equipmentc,t = α+θ
[
USMilext−1×
(
1
7
2012∑
t=2006
Pct
)]
+δ‘Xc,t+α
2
c+η
2
s,t+υc,t
(2)
where USMilext−1 is US military spending in constant US$ and Pct is a
dummy for whether c received any military aid in year t. Conceptually, we
have two sources of variation. We have identification along the extensive
margin of whether aid is received and along the intensive margin of how
many items are received. The former variation is captured by the probabil-
ity of aid receipt, allowing us to compare crime responses between counties
that have received aid for the same number of years. Naturally, this gives
the IV a mechanical positive correlation to the dependent variable in the
first stage, which is, however, alleviated by the inclusion of county fixed
effects, absorbing the probability factor in the instrument. This leaves
the variation in military expenditure to aid identification through its effect
on the intensive margin. As Nunn & Qian (2014) make clear, this strat-
egy resembles a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, where in the
first-stage (and in the reduced-form) we compare counties that frequently
receive aid to counties that rarely receive aid, in years following high US
military spending relative to years following lower military spending. The
main difference from a difference-in-differences strategy is that our treat-
ment variable is continuous.
Our identification strategy is based on the premise that, conditional on
other contextual variables, our instrument has an impact on the crime rate
only through the provision of military equipment. Note that the exclusion
restriction is not violated if higher US military spending affects crime rates
through its national or regional influence on e.g., voluntary military re-
11Nunn & Qian (2014) investigate the effect of US food aid on conflict by using
exogenous variations in US wheat production and in recipients’ tendency to receive a
positive amount of US food aid.
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cruitment, as the inclusion of state-year fixed effects and control variables
flexibly account for any national or state-specific changes over time. Note
also that neither our instrument nor the crime rate in US counties displays
monotonic trends, thus ruling out the possibility of a spurious correlation.12
Figure 2 presents a comparison between counties that have received aid
only once or two times, denoted as low recipients, and counties that have
received aid at least three times throughout the sample period, denoted
as high recipients. Each group makes up about 40% of the sample. We
observe a decrease in crime for both groups of counties, yet this decrease is
more pronounced for the high recipients (Figure 2a); this is consistent with
the fact that high recipients display a more marked increase in the amount
of military aid they acquire in relation to total surges in available military
hardware (Figure 2b). Figure 3 presents a taste of our results in the first
and second stages of our IV approach. We observe a remarkable positive
correlation between total military aid and our instrument. We also observe
a substantial negative relation between the fitted values of total aid and
crime rate.
—————— [Figure 2 in here] ——————
—————— [Figure 3 in here] ——————
V Results
In this section we first examine the impact of military aid on crime and
arrest rates; we also discuss the degree to which our estimates can be
interpreted as providing evidence of deterrence; additionally, we try to
establish the extent to which distinct crimes such as robbery and assault
respond differently to increases in each category of military aid such as
12On one hand, although the US has experienced a general decline in crime rates in
recent years, there is a lot of heterogeneity across counties and some categories of crime
such as burglaries and larcenies have hardly seen significant changes in the aggregate
over time. At the same time, both military spending and the number of US military
casualties per year display an inversely U-shaped pattern. Moreover, the interaction
between US military spending (or casualties) and Pct gives lower weights to counties
with arguably less crime i.e., those that have requested/received aid less frequently.
Thus, assuming that the relation is spurious, if the resulting coefficient is negative, it
would have an upward bias toward 0.
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weapons and vehicles; we then present results from a variety of robustness
tests; and we conclude with a basic cost-benefit analysis.
A Does aid affect crime rates?
Our first question revolves around the existence of a causal effect of military
aid on crime. Table 2 incorporates the baseline model. Column 1 presents
the reduced form relationship between aid and crime. We find that a naive
OLS estimation would not reveal any influence of aid on crime, which
is consistent with Figure 1.13 Column 2 shows the first stage estimates.
As expected, we find that an increase in the military expenditure of the
previous year - holding aid receipt probability constant - leads to a higher
amount of aid received by the county. The Kleinbergen-Paap F-Statistic is
similar to the conventional F-statistic, but takes into account the clustering
of the standard errors, with a value of 49, above conventional levels that
characterize weak instruments.
Column 3 of Table 2 shows that military aid reduces the total number
of crimes: a ten percent increase in the total value of military aid leads to
a decrease of 5.9 crimes per 100,000 population. The negative coefficient
reveals that our prediction that the positive correlation between aid and
crime could bias the naive OLS estimates upward, as in column 1, was
correct.
Further, reading across the first row of results in Table 2, we find that
this reduction can be attributed to a decrease in robberies, assaults, bur-
glaries, larcenies and motor vehicle thefts. The effect is very pronounced
for street-level crime types, like larceny and vehicle theft, whereas it is
insignificant for homicide. This suggests that military aid could have a de-
terrent effect based on greater visibility. This “display” mechanism could
deter crime by increasing the subjective probability of arrest.
On the last line of Table 2, we present estimates of the elasticity of crime
with respect to the value of equipment. The biggest elasticity we observe
is -.15 for robbery, followed by motor vehicle theft with -.09, assault -
13We report the results for the control variables in Table A.2 in the Appendix. More-
over, in Table A.3, we show the OLS estimates of the effect of military aid on all
categories of crime, which are all consistent with the absence of a statistically significant
effect.
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.236 and -.023 for the total crime rate.14 These elasticities are well within
the boundaries of -.01 to -2 presented in previous literature (Chalfin &
McCrary, 2014). They are smaller than Evans & Owens’s (2007) elasticities
of crime with respect to the size of the police force, between - .26 and - .99,
also based on US data.
—————— [Table 2 in here] ——————
B Is the effect of aid on crime driven by police ef-
forts?
In this subsection we explore several potential channels through which aid
could influence crime reduction. We first establish the effect of aid on arrest
rates. If military aid increased police efficiency and ability to solve crimes,
then we should find that the number of arrests increases relative to the
crime rate. Moving across the columns of Table 3, we do not find strong
support for an effect of military equipment on the number of arrests. On
the one hand, the substantive effect is negligible, and, e.g., a ten percent
increase in total aid leads to a 0.16 decrease in the number of arrests for
robbery per 100, 000 population. On the other hand, the decline in the
number of arrests could be fully attributed to the decline in the underlying
crime rate.15 Therefore, it seems that military aid does not improve the
arresting performance of local police units, thus revealing that it most likely
helps to deter individuals from participating in illegal activities in the first
place.
—————— [Table 3 in here] ——————
Table 4 captures other ways in which law-enforcement can alter the ar-
rest perceptions of criminals. The dependent variables are the number of
police officers, the number of civilian employees, the ratio between officers
and civilian employees, the number of received calls, the number of injuries
14Running a log-log model yields virtually the same elasticity.
15In fact, when we control for crime rate, the effect of military aid on the number of
arrests becomes insignificant at the conventional level. We do not explicitly include this
additional model though, as crime rate is endogenous to military aid, and can constitute
an improper control.
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or assaults in the line of duty, and the number of offenders killed by the
police. As we can see, military aid might influence hiring decisions by in-
ducing law enforcement agencies to devote more resources to hiring of new
police officers and civilian employees. If labor and capital are substitutes
in the police production function, then the increase in available capital
might lead to a decrease in the labor employed. Whereas the number of
officers declines by a very small magnitude, the number of civilian em-
ployees declines by 0.2 for a ten percent increase in the size of the military
aid. Moreover, military aid neither affects police activities measured by the
number of calls they receive nor has a significant impact on the number of
police officers assaulted or injured in the line of duty; it also does not have
an effect on the number of offenders killed by the police.
To further check the existence of alternative channels linking the “1033
Program” to police performance, we look at the effect of aid on citizens’
complaints. One of the most popular arguments against the militarization
of the police forces is the probability of a disproportionate use of aggressive
weapons and tactics on undeserving targets which can undermine a pro-
ductive and trustworthy interaction between the police and the local pop-
ulation. If subscribing to this claim, we would observe a positive impact
of aid on citizens’ complaints. Yet, as Harris et al. (2016) point out, mil-
itary hardware may also reduce complaints if citizens are too intimidated
to express dissatisfaction with the behavior of the police. We therefore
consider the impact of the 1033 Program on the number of citizen com-
plaints, compiled from published annual reports of police departments, and
made available by Harris et al. (2016). The last column of Table 4 shows
that acquiring military items has a negative effect on complaints, yet not
significant.
Therefore, it seems that the deterrent effect observed in Table 2 comes
either through a response of the supply side of the market for crimes, that is,
criminals themselves refrain from crime or there is an unobservable police
effort component not captured by our indicators. Military aid therefore
seems to lead to a reduction in crime rates mainly through a deterrence
mechanism.
Taken together, our results are similar to those of Harris et al. (2016).
Both studies find a decrease in robberies, assaults and vehicle thefts, albeit
14
Harris et al. (2016) find bigger effects. Both studies also find a negative
effect of tactical equipment on citizen complaints. Finally, Harris et al.
(2016) find a negative effect on the clearance of motor vehicle theft crime;
whereas we also find a negative effect of military aid on overall arrest rates,
the magnitude of the coefficients in our models is very small. The differ-
ences between our findings and those of Harris et al. (2016) should be
considered in light of the peculiar operationalization of military aid (Harris
et al. (2016) use the quantity rather than the value), the different sample
size, the choice of the control variables and, perhaps more importantly, the
heterogeneity of treatment effects. We use two conceptually distinct instru-
ments and it is likely that in our framework the subset of “compliers” is
different from that in Harris et al. (2016). While Harris et al. (2016) filter
the effect for counties which are more sensitive to transportation costs, we
give more weight to recipients in high spending years.
—————— [Table 4 in here] ——————
C Which type of military aid is the most constructive
in combating crime?
Our third question relates to the existence of distinctive effects of different
categories of military aid on crime rates. This is a crucial question in light
of the recent heated debate on the questionable use of military weapons and
tactics by the police forces. We restrict our attention to aggregate crime
as well as to the crime indices which were found to be significantly affected
by aid (Table 2). Results are reported in the Appendix, Table A.4, which
shows a sort of hierarchy in the marginal impact of aid on crime: the resid-
ual category, labeled “others”, which includes only non-lethal equipment,
without military attributes, has the biggest marginal effect on the reduc-
tion of crime. This is most evident in the fifth panel of Table A.4, where a
ten percent increase in this category reduces the total number of crimes by
almost seven units per year. The second class of items is vehicles, and the
final one is gears, where the effects found do not seem to be significantly
different than for the effect for Total Aid.16 Two basic implications emerge:
16 In Table A.4, we also present the p-values for a Wald test for difference in the
coefficient of the row variable with the coefficient on “Lagged Total Aid”.
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firstly, two highly visible tools, gears and vehicles, have strong and sizable
effects on all the types of crime. Although vehicles are easily detectable,
note that gears include sophisticated electronic equipment, training aid
and, in almost half of the instances, clothing. This is consistent with early
studies by e.g., Bell (1982), which explore how police wearing military-style
uniforms influences citizens’ perception of the police’s authority and legiti-
macy, and reinforces the notion that a main causal channel could be based
on perceptual deterrence. Secondly, even though the residual category is
still too aggregate and too large to make reasonable claims about which
of its subcomponents are driving the effect, the inclusion of diverse office
equipment could entail that law enforcement agencies are able to improve
the efficiency of their organizational practices and, therefore the alloca-
tion of their time resources, resulting in more patrols or other unobserved
crime-deterring activities. Additionally, the inclusion of IT hardware in
the residual category might ultimately lend support to previous findings
by Mastrobuoni (2014) on how IT adoption (or innovation) affects crime.17
Although weapons do not appear to work as a deterrence tool, note
that our instrument seems to be weak at predicting the allocation of the
weapon category. This applies to all the four sub-categories of crime in
which we are interested as well as to the overall crime level. It seems that
our instrument does not capture well the allocation decisions related to
weapons in high spending years, most likely pointing to a caution from the
policymaker associated with the controversy on the value-added of using
battlefield weapons to police urban areas.
D Robustness Checks
We verify our findings with a round of additional checks. We omit tables
due to space limitations, although all additional models can be found in
the online Appendix. Table A.5 limits the underlying sample to counties
in which the mean population size is lower than 250,000 inhabitants, and
where the unemployment rate, the poverty rate, the median income within
a county and the share of blacks are higher than the national median.
17As aid without clear military attributes is not the focus of this article, however, we
leave this facet to future research.
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Exploring various cuts, we can see that the control variables are not sub-
stantially driving our results and neither can we report a heterogeneity in
the effect of aid on crime.
In Table A.6, panel A, we replace the value of military aid by its quan-
tity. Our results remain significant, thus lending additional support to
previous results. Note that we cannot explicitly comment on the substan-
tive effects as each category contains highly heterogeneous items. Panels
B and C of Table A.6 exploit alternative, yet related, instruments, such as
the interaction between the probability of receipt and the amount of mili-
tary spending in percentage of GDP or the total number of US fatalities in
Afghanistan and Iraq (instead of the level of US military spending). The
rationale behind the inclusion of the share of output devoted to the mili-
tary, also called the military burden, is that it measures the priority given
to defense rather than to military power or the absolute level of military ex-
penditure (Smith, 2009). As we can see, the coefficients are significant and
in the same order of magnitude as in Table 2. Using US military casualties
as an alternative instrument allows us to effectively capture the intensity
of military deployments and the severity of war, which, in turn, influence
the procurement of military equipment. Again, previous findings about aid
and crime are strongly borne out by this new set of empirical results. The
coefficients are similar to our baseline models and the F-statistics are above
conventional levels.
In Table A.7, panel A, all results are weighted by the size of the mean
population to reflect crime as a population mean, and, by and large, the
results carry over. In fact, the coefficients are now distinctly higher, and
still statistically significant. In panel B we replace total aid by its per
capita counterpart, and the coefficients retain the same magnitude and
are statistically significant. In panel C we keep a subsample of counties
that contain law-enforcement that have fully complied with Uniform Crime
Reports reporting, that is, with 100 percent coverage of reported crime.
We, however, drop almost half of the observations and find that the results
on robbery, assault and vehicle-theft survive this robustness check.
In the last table (Table A.8), we account in different ways for preex-
isting trends in crime. In panel A we include year fixed effects instead of
the interaction between year and state fixed effects, whereas in panel B we
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include county-specific linear trends to the baseline specification and we
exclude state-time dummies. In this way we account for differential crime
trends across counties. On both exercises our baseline results remain un-
affected and, if anything, accounting for differential crime trends leads to
higher effect sizes. Finally, in panel C, we only focus on counties which
have received a positive amount of aid for at least one year and for less
than seven years. The purpose of this exercise is purely mechanical as we
want to show that our effects are not driven by the most frequent recip-
ients of aid. We find the same effects, with a first stage coefficient that
is higher than the one estimated in the baseline model. Intuitively, the
variation in such counties is more likely to be absorbed by the fixed effects,
which explains why the absence of these counties has such a small impact
on the estimated coefficient in the first stage and leads to an increase of
the same coefficient. To further demonstrate this, consider Figure A.2, a
binned scatterplot for the first stage by different probabilities of receiving
aid. The Figure shows that the relationship between the instrument and
Total Aid is more positive for counties that received aid in two, three or
four years out of seven.18 Hence, exploring various estimation techniques
and specifications, we feel confident to conclude that military aid reduces
crime, and that the effect may be driven by a deterrence mechanism.
E Cost and Benefit Analysis
We perform a basic cost-benefit analysis by comparing estimates from our
baseline models (Table 2) with estimates of the social cost of particular
crimes. Heaton (2010) provides one of most recent reviews of academic
research on the cost of crime in the US, including accounting-based methods
(all the individual costs borne by individuals and society) and contingent
valuations (what individuals are willing to pay for crime reduction). He
summarizes the cost estimates from three studies of the cost of crime,
two using accounting-based methods (Cohen & Piquero, 2009; McCollister
et al. , 2010) and one using contingent valuation (Cohen et al. , 2004). He
calculates that the average cost of a robbery is $67,277 (in 2007 US dollars),
18Figure A.2 also suggests a lack of mechanical positive bias between the instrument
and the instrumented variable, otherwise the fit lines would be arranged with seven
years as the highest positive slope and one year of aid as the lowest.
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of a serious assault $87,238, of a burglary $13,096, of a larceny $2,139 and
of a motor-vehicle theft $9,079. By our baseline and most conservative
models (Table 2) a ten percent increase (around $5,800) in the value of
aid reduces robberies by almost 0.6 units, assaults by 0.5 units, burglaries
by 0.9 units, larceny by 2.7 units and vehicle thefts by 1.2 units. This
means that the benefit of a ten percent increase in aid is roughly $112,000,
compared to a cost of $5,800, making the donation of military equipment
a good investment.
VI Conclusions
In 1990 the US Congress enacted the National Defense Authorization Act,
later called the “1033 Program”, allowing local law enforcement agencies to
acquire excess property from the Department of Defense, including drones,
military weapons and armored vehicles. The program came under severe
scrutiny in 2014, following a wave of public protests against the dispropor-
tionate use of military tools by local police forces. By most reports, provid-
ing military equipment free of charge encourages hyper-aggressive forms of
domestic policing, which can increase tension, mistrust and uncooperative
behaviors between local police departments and local communities. Yet,
so far there have been no attempts to examine the tangible outcomes of
issuing military equipment to law enforcement agencies, not even its effect
on crime rates.
Using panel data for US counties over the 2006-2012 period, we provide
quantitative evidence on the effect of the “1033 Program” on police perfor-
mances. En route, we complement the economic literature on the determi-
nants of policing. Our identification strategy relies on exogenous variation
in timing and size of military spending to test whether the militarization
of local police forces improved their performances. The results reported
in this article provide evidence of a positive effect of military hardware on
crime rates, most likely via a deterrence mechanism. We run a number of
additional models to isolate this mechanism from other competing channels
such as various measures of observable police effort. Interestingly, although
all the non-lethal categories of aid are effective in preventing crime, this
effect is not reflected in a shift in observable police characteristics such as
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arrest rates, manpower or others, hinting at a possible alternative effect
channel of unobservable police effort.
The empirical literature on police resources and crime and most of the
public debate on this issue, assume that additional resources are allocated
to increase the size of the police force. Therefore, implicitly police costs are
labor costs. Yet, there is an important capital component in the production
function for law enforcement that is usually neglected, regardless of whether
new equipment is bought, provided for free or acquired at a greatly reduced
price. We estimate that a ten percent increase in the value of military aid
reduces the total number of crimes by 5.9 units. Despite a small total effect,
the program is quite cost-effective, and adding an extra $5,800 in overall aid
leads to a drop of roughly $112,000 in the social costs of robberies, assaults
and vehicle thefts combined. Our results seem to suggest that the returns
per dollar spent on the margin to capital might be even higher than for
labor, and this is an issue that certainly deserves further empirical research.
That said, taken together, our results do not directly provide evidence in
favor of or against the possibility that military equipment contributes to
overly aggressive approaches by police units, which can in turn escalate to
a standoff between urban communities and the officers that police them.
This is a social cost that our analysis cannot duly capture and it is an
important point for future research.
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Figure 1: Crime Rate (per 100,000) and Average Aid per Capita
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Figure 2: Crime Rate and Military Raid
Notes: Both figures represent plots for raw data. Low Recipient Counties are defined
as counties that have received military aid one or two times (40% of the sample). High
Recipient Counties are those that have received military aid at least three times (40%
of the sample).
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Figure 3: Binned scatter plot representations of the first (second) stage
of our analysis. Each point of the scatter represents the mean military
expenditure (crime) and total aid over equally sized bin. The line presents
a linear fit.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Crime Rate 2473.9 1519.9 0 40594.9 17822
Murder Rate 3.4 6.8 0 182.8 17822
Robbery Rate 40.5 68.5 0 2432.4 17822
Assault Rate 199.1 195 0 5581 17822
Burglary Rate 585 422.9 0 12773.4 17822
Larceny Rate 1515.3 936.6 0 18897.6 17822
Vehicle Theft Rate 130.5 132.6 0 3839.1 17822
Murder Arrest Rate 2.8 5.9 0 134.2 17656
Robbery Arrest Rate 15 22.3 0 628.9 17656
Assault Arrest Rate 97.1 92.1 0 1747.9 17656
Burglary Arrest Rate 82.8 70 0 1097.8 17656
Larceny Arrest Rate 293.4 262.1 0 7844.2 17656
Vehicle Arrest Theft 19.1 23.8 0 608.5 17656
Military Exp. IV 4.3 3.7 0 13.5 17822
Total Aid (value) 57668.1 1235903.9 0 152824128 17822
Total Aid (quantity) 69.1 1076.5 0 97348 17822
Weapons Aid 1479.8 13795.9 0 675916.4 17822
Weapons Quantity 10.9 212.4 0 21586 17822
Vehicles Aid 34521.5 1196029.7 0 152279640.2 17822
Vehicles Quantity 1.4 15.3 0 715 17822
Gears Aid 11235.3 136707.7 0 8574024 17822
Gears Quantity 30.3 673.7 0 78634 17822
Others Aid 10431.5 130567.6 0 6847195.2 17822
Others Quantity 26.5 495.1 0 31032 17822
Percent Poverty 16.3 6.3 2.4 62 17822
Median Income 43689.5 11186.5 19829 121250 17822
Unemployment Rate 7.7 3.2 1.1 29.1 17822
Population 96694.5 261689 16 5151374 17822
Share Males 0.5 0 0.3 0.8 17822
Share Blacks 0.1 0.2 0 0.9 17822
Share Age 15-19 0.1 0 0 0.3 17822
Share Age 20-24 0.1 0 0 0.4 17822
Share Age 25-29 0.1 0 0 0.3 17822
Share Age 30-34 0.1 0 0 0.2 17822
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Table 2: The Effect of Military Aid on Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
OLS First Stage Crime Homicide Robbery Assault Burglary Larceny Vehicle Theft
Military Exp. IV 17.589***
(2.510)
Lagged Total Aid 0.692 -59.293*** -0.063 -6.102*** -5.305** -8.750* -27.429*** -11.644***
(1.185) (14.040) (0.094) (1.088) (2.348) (5.307) (7.218) (2.807)
Constant 6800.270* -55.150***
(3439.930) (12.177)
Observations 17822 17822 17807 17807 17807 17807 17807 17807 17807
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 49.113 49.113 49.113 49.113 49.113 49.113 49.113
Elasticity -0.023 -0.018 -.15 -0.026 -.014 -.018 -0.09
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1 and 3 is total crime per 100,000 population, in column 2 it is military aid, from column 4 onwards it is the category
of crime per 100,000 population. Control variables: median income, poverty rate, unemployment rate, population, share of males, blacks, and age 15-19,
20-24, 25-29, 30-34. All models include county and interacted state-year fixed effects. The instrument is lagged military expenditure times the probability of
receiving military aid. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level reported in parenthesis. Asterisks denote: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 3: The Effect of Military Aid on Arrest Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Homicide Robbery Assault Burglary Larceny Vehicle Theft
Lagged Total Aid -0.389** -1.581** -3.143 -4.002** -7.317* -1.484***
(0.182) (0.637) (2.262) (1.900) (3.983) (0.521)
Observations 17640 17640 17640 17640 17640 17640
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 45.881 45.881 45.881 45.881 45.881 45.881
Notes: The dependent variable is arrest rate per category of crime. Control variables: median income, poverty
rate, unemployment rate, population, share of males, blacks, and age 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34. All models
include county and interacted state-year fixed effects. The instrument is lagged military expenditure times the
probability of receiving military aid. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level reported in parenthesis.
Asterisks denote: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 4: The Effect of Military Aid on Police Activities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Civilian Officers to Civil Disorder Offenders Citizen
Officers Employees Employees Ratio Calls Injuries Assaults Killed Complaints
Lagged Total Aid -0.405* -2.368** 0.001 -0.185 -0.063 -0.003 -0.010 -0.085
(0.227) (0.966) (0.001) (0.195) (0.048) (0.005) (0.032) (0.081)
Observations 148691 148691 119069 148691 148691 148691 16605 516
KP F-Statistic 11.494 11.494 10.626 11.494 11.494 11.494 9.634 2.384
Notes: The dependent variable is the numbers of officers (column 1), of civilian employees (column 2), their ratio (column 3), the number of
calls (column 4), injuries (column 5), assaults (column 6) on the police, the number of offenders killed (column 7) and the number of citizen
complains (column 8). Control variables: median income, poverty rate, unemployment rate, population, share of males, blacks, and age
15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34. All models include county and interacted state-year fixed effects. The instrument is lagged military expenditure
times the probability of receiving military aid. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level reported in parenthesis. “KP F-Statistic”
stands for Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic. Asterisks denote: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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